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2. Humanitarian assistance and minorities 






This rapid literature review, surveys evidence regarding the challenges specific religious 
minorities face in accessing humanitarian assistance. This review acknowledges that there 
remains a paucity of research on the presence, scale and diversity of religious groups, 
experiences, values, motivations and engagements in a range of humanitarian contexts and how 
these intersect to mediate access to humanitarian assistance. The report also acknowledges that 
the complexity of settings in which humanitarian actors are operating often influences how 
assistance is provided. Experiences of persecution and active targeting of religious minorities 
must thus be understood alongside the politicisation of contexts in which access is often 
mediated by a range of state and non-state actors. 
More broadly, underpinning the provision of humanitarian assistance are a set of principles that 
govern the way humanitarian response is carried out. The four guiding principles are humanity, 
impartiality, independence and neutrality. Whilst these principles are long established, challenges 
in terms of their application and interpretation have beset the humanitarian community 
complicated by the complexity of contemporary humanitarian contexts. Interpretations of these 
principles also has particular relevance when considering the challenges that religious minorities 
face in accessing humanitarian assistance.  
More specifically, the increasing polarisation of societies in many contexts, often underpinned by 
deep underlying and unresolved tensions between majority and minority groups, have made 
religious minorities particularly vulnerable to violence, persecution and displacement – this 
polarisation has also influenced how access to humanitarian assistance is mediated. Indeed, 
disaster response processes often reveal the extent to which political and social dynamics criss-
cross society, state and aid relations.  
In the context of this report it is important to understand who is most vulnerable to threats and 
that this may involve important differentiation by age, gender, ethnic group, social status, religion 
or other factors. Given the above, it is broadly acknowledged that ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities and indigenous peoples may be overlooked in an emergency response due to a range 
of factors:  
 Humanitarian actors may not be aware of the presence of minority groups; 
 Minorities may have a weak socio-economic position which may render them less visible; 
 Minorities may experience marginalisation in the country of origin or country of arrival. 
Minorities can often represent a particularly vulnerable proportion of those seeking international 
protection. Factors that may influence access to humanitarian assistance include: 
 Active targeting or religious minorities based on religious identities;  
 A reluctance by certain communities to make themselves ‘more visible;’  
 Concerns regarding displacement in countries that may be hostile to particular minorities;  
 Minorities may have a preference for accessing humanitarian assistance from actors; 
within their community or from international faith-based bodies; 
 The “religion-blind policy” of humanitarian actors has also been muted by some 
commentators. 
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More broadly, humanitarian actors may view religious identity as a source of conflict which can 
exacerbate identity politics particularly with regard to displaced groups/minorities. In the Syrian 
context, humanitarian actors interviewed for a recent Migration Research Unit report cited a 
preference to avoid engagement with religion in responding to displacement. This was due to two 
assumptions: 
 That religion was a non-essential feature of displacement and unimportant in relation to 
the hierarchy of refugee identities, needs, and experiences. 
 That religion is a source of conflict and identity politics. This was particularly pertinent in 
relation to assumptions held about the role of religion for Syrian refugees.  
Some commentators assert that limited engagement with religious identity is in part due to 
(mis)interpretations of humanitarian principles of neutrality and universality and widespread 
assumptions held about religion as non-essential or divisive. The case studies identified in this 
report highlight that exclusion of religion in displacement affects religious minorities in relation to 
their wellbeing, security protection and access to humanitarian services. It is also suggested that 
understanding these experiences is essential to enhancing more inclusive refugee aid and 
protection for a range of refugee populations. Findings from case studies include: 
Yemen: In the context of rising religious extremism, the threat of targeted violence between 
Sunni and Zaidi Shi’a Muslims has increased. It is asserted that the discourse of various parties 
to the conflict has deepened the fault lines of a conflict that, though rooted in economic, social 
and political grievances, risks becoming defined in sectarian terms. In Yemen, restrictions and 
issues of access intersect with the marginalisation of minorities when it comes to aid distribution 
and relocation to safer areas. 
Syria: Due to sectarian tensions and fears of reprisal attacks, Syrian Christian and Druze 
refugees often choose not to register with UNHCR and in order to avoid formal refugee camps, 
they seek lodging in urban centres, often living in monasteries, clustered housing, or makeshift 
camps. In such settings, religious minorities experience isolation, stigmatisation, and (perceived 
or real) discrimination in accessing humanitarian aid and assistance. 
Iraq: ECHO partners have noted that humanitarian access is often dictated by constraints in 
areas in which they are able to travel securely. Humanitarian actors reported that they didn’t 
distinguish their beneficiaries in Iraq on the basis of aspects such as religious beliefs, political 
opinion, or ethnic, and cultural background. The preference of humanitarian organisations was to 
support certain beneficiary groups regardless of their status of need, but based on their 
organisational mandates or missions, and the type of work they carry out and for whom.  
Myanmar: During post-cyclone disaster responses, assistance for Muslim groups was generally 
international. International humanitarian actors faced four broad challenges: stigmatisation and 
security risks, government control, uncertainty, and manipulation. International humanitarian 
actors devoted significant effort to navigating the governmental barriers and the social and 
political tensions inherent in supporting highly stigmatised Muslim minorities. In contrast, the Chin 
ethnicity (Christian), parallel minority and diaspora networks were mobilised. Relief, which was 
not always distributed in a transparent or unbiased manner, was channelled from ethnically and 
religiously affiliated groups within and outside of Myanmar.  
Sub-Saharan Africa: Denial of access by militants or armed militias, is the single greatest 
obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance in contexts such as Somalia and the Central 
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African Republic. For example, Al Shabaab not only creates a prohibitive security environment, 
but also restricts humanitarian operations in southern Somalia 
2. Humanitarian assistance and minorities 
There are a number of meanings for the term humanitarianism. In the context of this report 
‘humanitarian’ signifies the practice of saving lives and alleviating suffering. It is usually related to 
emergency response (also called humanitarian response) whether in the case of a natural or 
man-made disasters such as war or other armed conflict (DuBois, 2018). Commentators 
acknowledge that such events are often profoundly affected by political and social factors which 
often shape events. Indeed, disaster response processes often reveal the extent to which 
political and social dynamics permeate society, state and aid relations (Pelling & Dill, 2010; 
Hutchison, 2014). This is particularly true in countries fraught by conflict. 
Underpinning the provision of humanitarian assistance are a set of principles that govern the way 
humanitarian response is carried out – these are intended to be applied in a range of contexts 
and settings (NRC, 2017). These principles are central to establishing and maintaining access to 
affected populations in both natural disasters and complex emergency situations. In disaster 
management, compliance with the principles are considered essential elements of humanitarian 
coordination. The four guiding principles adopted by the United Nations are as follows: 
 Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of 
humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.  
 Impartiality: Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving 
priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no adverse distinction on the 
basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinion.  
 Independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, 
military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where 
humanitarian action is being implemented.  
 Neutrality: Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in 
controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. 
Whilst these principles are long established, challenges in terms of their application and 
interpretation have beset the humanitarian community. They also have particular relevance when 
considering the challenges that religious minorities face accessing humanitarian assistance.  
Such principles are also complicated by the complexity of contemporary humanitarian contexts. 
A Foreign and Commonwealth Office Wilton Park event in 2018 asserted that the current global 
humanitarian context has seen increasingly protracted humanitarian crises, which on average 
last well over seven years and lead to exacerbated situations of vulnerability, instability and 
violence. They continue that the increasing polarisation of societies, often underpinned by deep 
underlying and unresolved tensions between majority and minority groups, have made [religious] 
minorities particularly vulnerable to violence, persecution and displacement (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2018)1. In a range of humanitarian contexts, minority groups face 
persecution by state and non-state actors and an array of challenges in accessing assistance. 
                                                   
1 https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/event/wp1641/  
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Persecution of minorities 
Persecution or minorities can be broadly defined as violence or discrimination against minority 
groups, involving actions intending to deprive political rights and force minorities to assimilate, 
leave, or live as second-class citizens. Persecution of minority groups is prevalent in many 
contexts whether afflicted by disasters or not. Referring to disaster contexts, Slim and Bonwick 
(2005) comment that it is important to understand who is the most vulnerable to threats and that 
this may involve important differentiation of the threats by age, gender, ethnic group, social 
status, religion or other factors.  
According to the former UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Rita Izsàk-Ndiaye, there is a 
clear link between minority status and vulnerability in times of crisis: ‘minorities, whether ethnic, 
national, religious or linguistic, can be disproportionately affected, either directly or indirectly, 
owing to their minority status, during the crisis itself or in the aftermath when seeking protection’ 
(MRGI, 2017: 12). 
In turn, the UNHCR (2019) acknowledge that ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and 
indigenous peoples may be overlooked in an emergency response due to a range of factors:  
 Humanitarian actors may not be aware of the presence of minority groups,  
 Minorities may have a weak socio-economic position which may render them less visible,  
 Minorities may experience marginalisation in the country of origin.  
Given the above factors, minorities can often represent a particularly vulnerable proportion of 
those seeking international protection. Furthermore, in many parts of the world, they may be 
victims of severe human rights violations, violence, conflict, ethnic or religious persecution, and in 
extreme cases, genocide. Minorities (including religious) may face a number of protection risks 
that may entail more need than others in similar contexts. These include (UNHCR, 2019: 406-
407) 
 Minorities and indigenous peoples are among the most marginalised communities in 
many societies. They are often excluded from participation in social and economic affairs, 
may not have access to political power, and are frequently prevented from expressing 
their identities. These obstacles are exacerbated during displacement, which increases 
the risks they face. 
 Members of minority and indigenous groups can be at risk of harm from the surrounding 
population or from their own family or community. 
 If the violence that caused displacement targeted minority or indigenous communities, 
they may be at risk if it spills over into their countries of asylum. Children and women are 
particularly vulnerable to attack; community leaders, and men who are perceived to be 
potential combatants, are also at risk. 
 Because minorities and indigenous peoples often experience chronic poverty (and are 
affected by other forms of disadvantage/marginalisation), they may be at risk of 
becoming victims of trafficking, including sexual exploitation. This risk increases in a 
situation of displacement and is particularly acute for minority and indigenous children, 
young adults and women. 
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 Minority and indigenous women may be at high risk of sexual violence, and may have 
access to weaker community protection resources to draw in than more dominant social 
groups. 
 Minorities may lose important elements of their cultural identity if they are separated by 
displacement. This can be particularly harmful to people who have experienced 
distressing events or must adjust to new surroundings 
 Minorities may not speak frankly if interpreters are from a different community in the 
country of origin or country of asylum. 
Whilst minority groups of all types may face persecution, societal tension between religious 
communities in a number of countries has meant that religious minorities have been the target of 
violence and struggled to access assistance. The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on 
‘Freedom of Religion and Belief’ (FoRB) has reported that religious persecution is on the rise2. 
An independent review for the Foreign Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) 
reported that persecution on the grounds of religious faith is a global phenomenon that is growing 
in scale and intensity (Bishop of Truro, 2019). The report identified examples of persecution of 
Christian groups in a number of contexts where the art the minority are briefly summarised below 
(Bishop of Truro, 2019: 51-55): 
Iraq: The situation for Christians worsened following the fall of Saddam Hussain’s regime, as 
Islamist extremists increased attacks on non-Sunni minority groups. In the wake of mass internal 
displacement, local religious organisations have taken responsibility for providing humanitarian 
assistance. Such groups have been critical of the Iraqi government for their failure to channel aid 
to the internal refugees. The have also critiqued a lack of UN funding for Christian minority 
groups. Where formal international aid assistance is offered to Christians, efforts to rebuild it can 
be less than wholehearted and criticised as adopting a ‘religion-blind’ policy: a policy which fails 
to ensure that those whose need has been specifically generated by their creed, through the 
suffering of persecution, receive their fair share of aid. 
Nigeria: The Bishop of Truro highlighted that the “intensification of conflict” in Nigeria in recent 
years comes at a time when Christians in the country have suffered some of the worst atrocities 
inflicted on Christians anywhere in the world. Whatever the motivation behind attacks on 
Christians, it is striking that nobody is being brought to justice for these crimes. Where there is 
such impunity the incentive is clearly given for the attacks to continue and the affected 
communities are denied protection. 
Indonesia has historically been known for its moderate expression of Islam and its pluralist 
society. Over the last decade the country has seen a rise in extremist Islam and the politicisation 
of religion. The state is seen by some as a key driver of persecution against Christians both 
actively through its blasphemy legislation and passively in its failure to protect the Christian 
community from attacks. At a time when conservative Islam is on the rise with attendant threats, 
not only to Christians, but all minority faiths, it is considered important for Freedom of Religious 
Belief (FoRB) to be given sufficient priority, within the broader human rights agenda. 
China: Article 36 of China’s constitution grants citizens freedom of religious belief provided that 
religious activities do not ‘disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the 
                                                   
2 https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomreligion/pages/freedomreligionindex.aspx  
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educational system’ and religious organisations are not ‘subject to any foreign domination’. In 
practice, Christians who are not a part of the official Protestant Church or official Catholic Church 
have experienced harassment. Churches resist registration because the surveillance that 
accompanies it contravenes their human rights; they would be forced to adopt associated 
Government propaganda; “normal” religious activities as defined by the Government; and 
deprived of their freedom of thought and conscience, thus seriously restricting their ability to 
practise their faith freely without fear of reprisals. 
Sri Lanka: There has been a marked rise in attacks on Christian and Muslim communities in the 
decade following the end of the civil war. Recent years have seen a resurgence of Sinhalese 
Buddhist nationalism, which sees Sri Lankan identity entwined with Sinhalese ethnicity and 
majority Buddhist culture. A leading Christian Human Rights NGO began a specialist initiative 10 
years ago to monitor FoRB violations and reported that they are working effectively with the High 
Commission in Colombo. 
Pakistan: Religious minorities in Pakistan have experienced attacks and discrimination from 
extremist groups and wider society. Christians’ low social status in Pakistan often exacerbates 
this problem. The country’s blasphemy laws are used disproportionately against minority groups. 
Evidence was taken as to the significance and effectiveness of the like-minded group of 
diplomatic partners in Islamabad but direct supportive action (such as the High Commission 
evidenced in the past) depends entirely upon the good will and generosity of individual member 
states who are willing to intervene. It is clear that the continuing challenges in relation to 
educational provision and access reduce opportunities for religious minorities in Pakistan.  
Syria: Against a backdrop of chronic conflict in many parts of the country, ethnic and faith groups 
were targeted irrespective of numeric size, cultural or political influence, or geographic location. 
Many came under attack less for religious reasons and more for perceived bias or sympathy with 
a particular protagonist in the conflict. The complex civil war situation in Syria with multiple 
internal and external actors intervening has left minority religious groups vulnerable to 
intimidation, harassment and violent attacks. 
Bishop of Truro (2019) provides an insight into some of the challenges faced by religious 
minorities in a number of contexts and factors that may influence them accessing humanitarian 
assistance. These include, active targeting based on religious identities, a reluctance by certain 
communities to make themselves ‘more visible’ and concerns regarding displacement in 
countries that may be hostile to particular minorities. In some instances, those who have 
experienced explicit targeting by hostile groups may prefer to access assistance from within the 
community or from international faith based bodies. Of more concern, the above cases suggest 
that humanitarian actors in some contexts may adopt a “religion-blind policy”.  
Humanitarian assistance and religion 
Although the relationship between religion and humanitarianism has become an increasing area 
of focus for researchers and practitioners, the specific role and impact of religious identity in 
experiences of and responses to displacement is less understood (Eghdamian, 2017). Severe 
governance deficits and the breakdown of social order through conflict often translate into the 
systematic exclusion of certain groups along ethnic, religious, political and gender lines, thus 
seriously challenging both the effective provision of humanitarian support and access to 
assistance. Humanitarian principles that prioritise the delivery of assistance based on ‘need not 
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creed’ have at times been critiqued for failing to adequately respond to contexts where ‘need is 
based on creed’ (Bishop of Truro, 2019). 
Organisations such as United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 
assert that religious pluralism is not completely understood in the context of humanitarianism. 
They continue that it has been found that violence against religious minorities during conflict can 
also make them vulnerable to further attacks in refugee settings (USCIRF, 2018), yet religious 
plurality remains an under-researched factor in experiences of and responses to displacement. 
Religious identity is often viewed as a source of conflict and identity politics in displacement by 
humanitarian actors. According to Eghdamian (2017: 2-3) in the Syrian context, humanitarian 
actors interviewed in her research preferred to avoid engagement with religion in responding to 
displacement. This was due to two assumptions: 
 That religion was a non-essential feature of displacement and unimportant in relation to 
the hierarchy of refugee identities, needs, and experiences. 
 That religion is a source of conflict and identity politics. This was particularly pertinent in 
relation to assumptions held about the role of religion for Syrian refugees.  
This latter assumption plays a significant role in the ways in which humanitarian actors engaged 
with religion. Indeed, the view that religion is a source of issues was found, particularly in 
(perceived or real) discrimination for religious minorities.  
As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2011: 429) has outlined, the role of religion in forced migration (the focus 
of her research) has been generally examined as a cause of displacement, or as a significant 
factor in experiences of both internal and international displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011). 
This latter framing has explored the multiple ways religious identities and practices influence, 
inform and impact the lives of refugees. These include:  
 the role of faith-based communities in providing humanitarian assistance; 
 religion as a coping mechanism during displacement;  
 religion and spirituality in humanitarian responses to forced migration;  
 responses of local faith communities to the arrival of forced migrants. 
Eghdamian (2017) comments that there remains a paucity of research on the presence, scale 
and diversity of religious groups, experiences, values, motivations and engagements in a range 
of humanitarian contexts. Specifically, little is known about the role of religion in international 
displacement, particularly for minority religious groups. Some commentators assert that limited 
engagement with religious identity in displacement is in part due to (mis)interpretations of 
humanitarian principles of neutrality and universality and widespread assumptions held about 
religion as either non-essential or divisive (Eghdamian, 2017). 
Tools and approaches available to humanitarian actors 
A number of tools are available to assist humanitarian actors assess need and identify those 
most at risk, principal amongst these are participatory assessments. Participatory assessments 
are mapping exercises focused on identifying protection risks among refugee populations 
(UNHCR, 2006). UNHCR guidelines specifically state that the purpose of the participatory 
assessments is to gather a statistical breakdown of a population and to identify people with 
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special needs. In other words, the purpose of the mapping exercises is to identify risks, to locate 
where people live, show what services are located near them, and to categorise how many 
diverse groups of people are among a given refugee population. These assessments are not an 
examination of the ways in which refugee communities draw on religion in various forms in 
displacement (Eghdamian, 2017). In light of the findings of this research, it is timely and urgent 
that participatory assessments explicitly identify and examine the role of religion in refugee 
experiences. A number of existing tools and approaches exist that identify best practice for 
reaching minority or vulnerable groups of all types – these include: 
 UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity Policy, 2011.  
 Protection Policy Paper: Understanding Community-Based Protection, 2013. 
 Need to Know Guidance: Working with National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Forced Displacement, 2011. 
 Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability 
 The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief;  
 The 2010 HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management;  
 The People In Aid Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid 
Personnel;  
 The Sphere Handbook Core Standards and the Humanitarian Charter;  
 The Quality COMPAS;  
 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Commitments on Accountability to Affected 
People/Populations (CAAPs); and  
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria for Evaluating Development and Humanitarian 
Assistance. 
Despite the above tools, a rapid literature review found no evidence of specific policies on the 
inclusion of religious identity as a factor in data collection and analysis for planning and 
developing relief operations; and making aid operations more accessible, approachable and 
inclusive in emergency situations (Bhardwaj, 2017). Bhardwaj (2017) continues that a few 
agencies have included guidance on approaches to data collection, analysis and protection; and 
are open to include religion and ethnicity as a factor in data collection where necessary and for 
specific purposes. It is not clear how these guidelines and recommendations are used for 
provision of aid and how religious identity is considered for accessing hard to reach and 
marginalised groups affected by humanitarian crises. The review demonstrated that the majority 
of humanitarian organisations tend to liaise with a number of actors, including religious 
communities, religious leaders, and faith-based organisations involved in a humanitarian 
response, to reach out to a range of groups of people affected by crises. 
A series of recommendations has been made for how providers of humanitarian assistance can 
better respond to the needs of minority groups, including religious minorities (UNHCR, 2019). 
Support services and care arrangements 
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 Respond at once and adequately to the specific needs of minorities and indigenous 
peoples. Map partners, set up referral mechanisms, and assess the community's 
capacities. 
 Take appropriate measures to ensure that minority and indigenous refugee communities 
can remain together, if they wish, to maintain their cultural heritage and identity. 
Identification and assessment procedures 
 Apply an age, gender and diversity (AGD) perspective to assess the situation of minority 
and indigenous groups. 
 Ensure that conditions are sufficiently secure for persons to feel comfortable about 
identifying themselves as members of a minority or an indigenous people. Make sure that 
persons not wishing to self-identify are not forced to do so, especially if they may be at 
risk. 
 Enter the specific needs of minority and indigenous persons into ProGres. 
Access to services 
 Be prepared to intervene on behalf of refugees who experience protection problems 
because they do not possess identity documents, are stateless, or face difficulties in 
accessing services and assistance in a non-discriminatory or unequal basis. 
 In consultation with minority and indigenous persons, ensure a safe space for minority 
and indigenous persons to practice their cultural traditions; strengthen community 
groups. 
Prevention of abuse and exploitation 
 Monitor the occurrence of harmful traditional practices and seek opportunities to address 
them in close consultation with the affected community. Work with the community to 
identify alternative practices that uphold values without violating rights. 
 Ensure that appropriate systems are in place to prevent and respond to violence, 
exploitation and abuse of minority or indigenous peoples. Establish monitoring 
mechanisms to this end. 
 All steps must be taken to protect minority and indigenous refugees from cross-border 
attacks or violence committed by other refugees or by members of host communities. Be 
prepared to provide safe accommodation or to offer evacuation in extreme 
circumstances. 
Inclusion and information sharing 
 Make sure that all programmes include minorities and indigenous peoples and that they 
receive information and messaging about programmes that concern them. 
 Encourage the involvement and meaningful representation of minority and indigenous 
women, LGBTI persons, persons with disabilities, older persons, and other groups at risk, 
provided this can be done safely. 
Awareness raising and advocacy 
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 Make sure that staff, partners, and local and national authorities understand and know 
how to respond to the specific needs of minorities and indigenous peoples. This requires 
sensitisation and training. 
 Encourage and assist communities to learn about and share their cultures. Involve the 
host community, refugees from majority communities, and minority and indigenous 
refugees. 
3. Case Studies 
This section provides an overview of a number of geographic contexts in which religious identity 
has influenced the experience of humanitarian assistance. As Appleby (2015) states, it is 
important to acknowledge that the term ‘religion’ is contested and fluid, expressing multiple 
meanings. Appleby (2015) continues that undertaking an analysis on religion may offer new 
thinking, as it relates to humanitarian contexts working with multi-religious groups, namely to shift 
away from the tendency to homogenise religious affiliations and identities and to engage with the 
complexities and challenges of religious heterogeneity. This section acknowledges that exclusion 
of religion in displacement affects religious minorities in relation to their wellbeing, security 
protection and access to humanitarian services. It is also suggested that understanding these 
experiences is essential to enhancing more inclusive refugee aid and protection for a range of 
refugee populations (Eghdamian, 2017). 
It is also important to note that the contexts in which humanitarian actors operate are often 
influenced by other factors (political, economic and social) Humanitarian actors such as 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), have reported state restrictions on ‘geographic access, 
programmatic options, and modalities of work’ in the authoritarian contexts of Sri Lanka, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Myanmar (del Valle & Healy, 2013: 198). In Ethiopia, civil society 
and international actors have described their inability to freely shape aid provision because of the 
governmental ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’ and restricted civil society space (Desportes et al. 2019: 
19). Such factors must also be considered when exploring the challenges faced by religious 
minorities in accessing humanitarian assistance. 
The case studies below attest to a series of distinct challenges that religious minorities face 
during displacement that are often overlooked. This includes, for instance:  
 members of religious minorities from who have fled to neighbouring states where they 
may face continued discrimination not only from officials and citizens in their host country 
but also from fellow displaced groups belonging to other communities;  
 minorities may be hesitant to register themselves with humanitarian agencies, for fear of 
being identified as belonging to minority communities and thereby risking harassment 
and discrimination.  
The Minority Rights Group International (MRGI, 2017: 15) also highlight that resettlement in third 
countries, while only accessed by a small number of refugees, can often exclude minorities as 
their specific needs are overlooked, such as information about application procedures in their 
own languages or access to translators from their own communities. They may also be actively 
excluded if local camp and embassy officials belonging to other ethnic groups or religious 
communities who act as gatekeepers, restrict access to registration, interviews and resettlement-
processing. These qualitative aspects need to be recognised by governments and organisations 
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supporting humanitarian services and inclusion, both to prevent further displacement and to 
create acceptable conditions for displaced communities (MRGI, 2017). 
MENA Trends and themes 
The Bishop of Truro (2019) reported that cases of persecution and discrimination against 
Christians are complex with mixed motives and multiple actors involved and vary depending on 
the degree of freedom of religion and belief in different countries in the region. In some cases the 
state, extremist groups, families and communities participate collectively in persecution and 
discriminatory behaviour.  
In countries such as Iran, Algeria and Qatar, the state is the main actor, where as in Syria, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt both state and non-state actors, especially religious 
extremist groups, are implicated. These factors have had a significant impact on the provision of 
assistance to displaced religious minorities. 
Yemen’s protracted civil war (2015-date) 
The Yemeni Civil War is an ongoing conflict that began in 2015 primarily between the Abdrabbuh 
Mansur Hadi led Yemeni government and Houthi armed movement. Circa 100,000 people have 
been killed, and over 3,000,000 displaced. In Yemen, existing patterns of discrimination before 
the outbreak of conflict have been deepened in a context of instability, violence and protracted 
humanitarian crisis (El Rajji, 2016). A briefing prepared by El Rajji (2016) for the Minority Rights 
Group International provides background information on Yemen, focusing on the situation of the 
most marginalised minorities in the conflict.  
Yemen’s population is predominantly Muslim (99%). The majority of Muslims in Yemen identify 
as Sunnis (this is estimated to be around 65% of the population), with Shi’as making up the 
remaining 35 per cent. Non-Muslims in Yemen account for less than 1% of the general 
population, there are a number of religious minorities in Yemen, including Bahá’í, Christians, 
Hindus and Jews. Yemen’s minorities also include a number of Muslim minorities such as the 
Zaidi Shi’as and Ismailis. Sufism is also practised in various parts of the country. In the context of 
the current conflict, minorities may face particular challenges in accessing protection and 
assistance.  
ACAPS (2019) categorises Yemen (as a whole) as inaccessible: “Insecurity, administrative 
constraints, entry restrictions, violence against humanitarian workers, and obstruction of civilian 
mobility hamper access. 6.5m people live in hard-to-reach areas. Fighting exacerbates access 
challenges, particularly in heavily populated western coastal areas. Checkpoints, landmines and 
explosive remnants of war as well as damaged roads and difficult terrain hinder movement. 
Armed actors have attempted to block aid from reaching groups suspected of disloyalty, directing 
it to groups more supportive of their agenda or selling it on the black market” (ACAPS, 2019: 6). 
Humanitarian agencies report facing bureaucratic constraints and restrictions on movements 
within or into Yemen (e.g. denials or long delays for visa applications for foreign humanitarian 
staff, difficulty obtaining custom clearance for medical supplies and other equipment from 
authorities). Moreover, despite the increased availability of humanitarian funding, access to 
reliable information on humanitarian needs in Yemen remains sparse (Maxwell et al., 2019) 
El Rajji (2016) asserts that in the context of rising religious extremism, the threat of targeted 
violence between Sunni and Zaidi Shi’a Muslims has increased. It is asserted that the discourse 
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of various parties relating to the conflict has deepened the fault lines of a conflict that, though 
rooted in economic, social and political grievances, risks becoming defined in sectarian terms. It 
is widely reported that Yemen’s Muslim and non-Muslim minorities have been targeted by 
sporadic acts of violence. Insecurity, lack of effective governance and the impact of blockades on 
the import of food, medicine, fuel and humanitarian assistance have led to Yemen being 
designated a severe humanitarian crises.  
El Rajji (2016) reports that community members may be side lined when it comes to aid 
distribution and prevented from relocating to safer areas, targeted measures must be in place to 
ensure that they are not excluded 
Humanitarian organisations’ limited capacities, access and ability to monitor distributions have 
further exacerbated the vulnerabilities of Yemen’s minority communities. Despite the urgency of 
the situation, few humanitarian agencies have actually returned or expanded their operations 
adequately to meet people’s needs. The briefing notes that groups such as the Muhamasheen 
minority group lack proper documentation, equal access to available resources, and are often 
made even more vulnerable by being displaced to the peripheries of cities or frontlines (El Rajji, 
2016). 
El Rajji (2016: 16-17) makes a series of recommendations to provide better targeted assistance 
to religious minorities.  
 The international community, and members of the UN Human Rights Council and donor 
countries should push for investigations into suspected violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law in the Yemen conflict. This includes allegations of 
indiscriminate attacks on internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, Muhamasheen 
settlements and targeted attacks against minorities.  
 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should increase 
its presence in the country and play a leading role in documenting and reporting on all 
human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law, including those 
targeting or particularly affecting minority groups.  
 The UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues should pay specific attention to the 
situation of minorities in Yemen, liaising with other UN mechanisms to ensure oversight 
and action where required.  
 The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief should pay specific attention 
to the situation of religious minorities in Yemen and report on acts of violence and the 
escalation of hate speech and its impact in Yemen.  
 Foreign governments, including Security Council member states, should push for the 
blockade to be lifted, ensuring that humanitarian assistance as well as essential 
commodities, including food, fuel and medicines can enter the country without 
restrictions.  
 Humanitarian organisations and UN agencies should expand their operations and field 
presence in Yemen, and push for more access to areas and communities most affected 
by conflict, including minorities such as the Muhamasheen.  
 Humanitarian organisations and UN agencies should ensure that assessments are made 
at the level of vulnerable communities, including Muhamasheen areas, and that the 
locations, numbers and needs of Muhamasheen, other minorities, refugees and migrants 
are analysed and met by adequate humanitarian and protection efforts. The distribution 
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and allocation of aid should be closely monitored to ensure it is reaching populations that 
need it the most.  
 The international community should ensure that specific attention is paid to the situation 
of all minorities in Yemen, and that hate speech as well as acts of targeted violence are 
swiftly and strongly condemned; pressure should be put on all parties to refrain from acts 
of violence against minorities, and to ensure that no such acts are committed.  
 The international community should ensure that any talks or future political solution to the 
conflict includes the issue of reparations – including financial compensations – by parties 
to the conflict (where possible) and the coalition specifically, to all civilians, including 
minority groups, affected by violations of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law. 
Syrian Christian and Syrian Druze Refugees in Jordan 
Bishop of Truro (2019) comments that due to lack of trust in the Syrian security system, and the 
extended damage to their homes, only a modest number of Christian refugees have returned to 
their homelands in Syria. Since the impact of the ongoing crisis in Syria on Christians has 
remained disproportionately high, Christian communities are heavily concentrated in 
government-controlled areas or in the North East. 
Eghdamian (2017) explored the experiences of Syrian Christian and Syrian Druze refugees 
among the Syrian refugee population in Jordan. Field research was conducted over a two-month 
period (2014) in urban centres across Jordan (Amman, Mafraq and Irbid). She comments that 
Syrian refugees in Jordan belong to and identify with different religious groups, which directly 
impacts their experiences of displacement. For religious minorities among the Syrian refugee 
population in urban centres in Jordan, religious identity was inextricably linked to the ways in 
which refugees fled their homeland, how they were received in the host country, where they were 
able to find safety, and their access to (or lack of) humanitarian services and protection. 
Religious minorities among the Syrian refugee population experience specific vulnerabilities in 
urban centres. Due to the large percentage of Syrian religious minorities living outside of camps 
and in urban centres, religious minorities experience specific vulnerabilities that need to be 
engaged with explicitly by humanitarian actors in their participatory assessments and 
subsequently, in their responses to humanitarian assistance and protection. 
Syrian Christian and Druze refugees living in urban centres in Jordan experience isolation, 
insecurity and discrimination because of their religious identity, revealing the importance of the 
religious dimension in displacement despite humanitarian desires to avoid or downplay religion.  
Due to sectarian tensions and fears of reprisal attacks, Syrian Christian and Druze refugees 
often choose not to register with UNHCR and in order to avoid formal refugee camps, they seek 
lodging in urban centres, often living in monasteries, clustered housing, or makeshift camps. In 
such settings, religious minorities experience isolation, stigmatisation, and (perceived or real) 
discrimination in accessing humanitarian aid and assistance. 
Eghdamian (2017: 2-6) also proposes a series of recommendations for how humanitarian actors 
can better provide assistance to religious minorities: 
 Identify religious vulnerabilities in participatory assessments and the role of 
religion in experiences of displacement. A change in the administrative structures of 
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UNHCR registration for newly arrived refugees from conflict zones fought across religious 
and sectarian lines may be required. Humanitarian actors should be trained in the 
sensitivities of religious identity for religious minority groups in such settings, encouraging 
deeper understanding of the multiplicity of issues, identities, and needs that refugees 
may have in different contexts. 
 Increase mutual communication and collaboration between religious groups. 
Humanitarian actors would do well to not only engage further with Faith Based 
Organisations and religious leaders but also directly with refugee and host communities 
that also identify themselves in religious terms. 
 Take into account non-instrumental values of religion. Engaging in and creating 
spaces for the exchange of religious concepts, values, and principles is an important way 
of contributing to positive engagements with religious pluralism.  
 Rethink language to reshape practice. Given the limited contexts and experiences of 
engaging with religion in humanitarianism, it can be seen how language reflects these 
limitations. Therefore, there is a need for UNHCR and other humanitarian actors to 
become more familiar with the religious needs and values of refugees across a range of 
affiliations, behaviours, values, and motivations. Doing so may help to more accurately 
reveal religiously inspired narratives of humanitarianism that also reflect nuances and 
complexities in the field. 
Iraq Conflict 
In 2017 the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC, 2017) commissioned a report on principled 
humanitarian assistance of European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) 
partners in Iraq. The review was undertaken with the support of the Directorate-General for 
ECHO, and took an in-depth look at the extent to which humanitarian organisations that receive 
ECHO funding have incorporated humanitarian principles in their strategy, decision-making, and 
practice in Iraq.  
The focus of the review was on the conflict in Iraq which at the time involved the Iraq Security 
Forces in their fight against non-state armed groups, most notably ISIL. At the time of the report 
publication, the conflict had led to the displacement of over three million Iraqis, including - along 
both ethnic and religious lines - Kurds, Arabs, Yezidis, Muslims, and Christians. Others chose or 
were forced to stay in their communities of origin under the control of ISIL. 
The review (NRC, 2017) found that humanitarian principles undoubtedly played a role for ECHO 
partners in Iraq. All partners stated that they consider the principles when setting priorities, 
negotiating access, and deciding on the type and level of engagement with parties to the conflict. 
The Review Team (NRC, 2017) was struck by the fact that representatives from four different 
ECHO partner organisations argued that “we can’t do principled humanitarian assistance since 
we have no access”, rather than taking the default position of “we do principled humanitarian 
assistance to get access”. The latter would require a negotiations strategy for access that 
includes the principles as a reference. The Review Team heard of a number of examples of 
internal security limitations. Another organisation representative highlighted that “a main internal 
difficulty to reach people in need is to figure out how quickly we can move into new areas that are 
possibly booby-trapped”. Other organisation representatives explained that their type of 
programming was not shaped to quickly move into new areas, and that their organisational 
structure simply was not created to respond to the type of rapidly changing context. These 
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examples suggest that the humanitarian imperative to ensure access to populations in need is 
frequently outweighed by security concerns. 
The Review Team (NRC, 2017) also found that the efforts of making contact with military forces 
and armed groups, and engaging with them to negotiate access indispensable for developing 
acceptance have in many cases been outsourced. Indeed, there is a tendency among the 
majority of ECHO partners to leave the job of engaging with armed forces to OCHA’s CMCoord. 
Finally, the Review Team (NRC, 2017) heard the frequent and wide-ranging use of the term ‘hard 
to reach areas’. When asked how they would define the term, some ECHO partners simply said 
that it refers to areas with particularly demanding security requirements. This would appear to be 
a natural consequence of humanitarian work in armed conflict settings. Others referred to ISIL-
held areas and noted that it is impossible to engage with this actor as it does not accept 
international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles. Three partners also argued that ‘hard 
to reach’ areas are those that are under-served by others, and hence where the access has not 
already been granted. This would not appear to be sufficient to be a justifiable barrier to 
humanitarian action, as it would rather indicate an ‘unreached’ area than a ‘hard to reach’ one. 
With relation to religious minorities, the Review Team noted that ECHO partners were quick to 
note that they do not distinguish their beneficiaries in Iraq on the basis of aspects such as 
religious beliefs, political opinion, or ethnic, and cultural background. The team suggested that 
one issue, not uniquely linked to Iraq but often overlooked, is the preference of humanitarian 
organisations to support certain beneficiary groups regardless of their status of need, but based 
on their organisational mandates or missions, and the type of work they carry out and for whom. 
When asked the question of how they prioritise activities and funding allocations, a third of the 
ECHO partners of the sample mentioned that they look at what the needs are, but also stated 
that they reflect on the comparative advantages of their organisation. 
This review provides an illustrative example of the extent to which access to humanitarian 
assistance is often shaped by factors beyond the control of individual minorities and even 
humanitarian actors with security concerns, pressure on resources and over such constraints 
dictating access and provision of assistance. 
Myanmar (Cyclone Nargis 2008) 
In Myanmar, the ‘decade-long conflict over the legitimacy of competing socio-political and armed 
actors’ intermingles with ‘the evolving agendas and priorities of international players’ through 
‘politics, money, and power’ (Décobert, 2016:  6). These factors play out, for instance, when 
authoritarian states refuse international assistance, as initially occurred when Cyclone Nargis 
devastated Myanmar in 2008 (Desportes, 2019). Desportes (2019) reports that international 
actors have long been reticent to take a stand on the government’s treatment of minorities. 
In the Nargis response, foreign aid was eventually allowed ‘selectively and reluctantly’ and was 
mostly distributed via government channels. Western rescue and medical staff and many vessels 
carrying relief goods were turned away at Myanmar’s border (Paik, 2011: 450-455). Assistance 
for Muslim groups, the most marginalised minorities in Rakhine, was generally international. 
International humanitarian actors faced four broad challenges: stigmatisation and security risks, 
government control, uncertainty and manipulation. 
Desportes (2016) reports that at organisational and individual staff levels, disaster responders 
feared stigmatisation and security repercussions of supporting Rakhine Muslims. Agencies 
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providing relief to Rakhine Muslims were criticised in public demonstrations, sometimes including 
the names and photos of staff members, who were labelled ‘terrorists’ for helping ‘Muslim 
terrorists’. Experience of cyclone Nargis and latterly Kommen revealed minority marginalisation 
practices perpetrated by the Myanmar Union government, with especially severe cases in 
Rakhine State.  
An interesting contrast is identified between minorities from different religious communities 
across the cyclone responses. Civil society and diaspora actors were unwilling or unable to 
support Muslims, leaving the task to international humanitarians. Deeming it too risky to advocate 
openly, international humanitarian actors devoted significant effort to navigating the 
governmental barriers and the social and political tensions inherent in supporting highly 
stigmatised minorities. This included closely monitoring authorities and different societal groups’ 
perceptions of their organisations and activities and reaching out to Buddhist communities, 
religious institutions and governmental actors to increase acceptance. For many, ‘50/50’ became 
the new targeting standard, openly departing from the principles of humanity and impartiality for 
the sake of minimising tensions. Ultimately, in a context where perceptions and even strategic 
decisions such as targeting are manipulated, the humanitarians largely ended up being played by 
the government system, which wanted humanitarians to be seen as targeting only Muslims. 
Myanmar (Cyclone Komen 2015) 
Desportes (2019) comments that little academic research has examined the challenges 
humanitarian actors face or the strategies they develop in the increasingly numerous 
authoritarian and low-intensity conflict settings. Deportes (2019) explores how civil society 
organisations, international non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and 
donor agencies tried to provide relief to marginalised minorities in the ethnic states of Chin and 
Rakhine following Cyclone Komen in 2015. 
The study findings detail how civil society actors mobilised parallel minority and Christian 
networks and lobbied international actors to support disaster victims of Chin ethnicity. In Rakhine 
State, it was overwhelmingly international humanitarians who were able and willing to support 
Muslims, including the Rohingya. This increased tensions among community groups and 
between national authorities and the international community, particularly in the context of rising 
identity politics. Desportes (2019) posits that trade-offs between long-term acceptance and 
following humanitarian principles in aid allocation are largely unavoidable and must be carefully 
considered. 
Desportes (2019) notes that disaster response can then be the very conduit through which the 
low intensity conflict is played out, further side-lining minorities, harming political opponents or 
increasing political support. When a disaster strikes in such settings, state and societal actors are 
likely to contest each other’s legitimacy, capacity and will to protect disaster victims—for 
instance, by accusing government authorities of not letting members of ethnic or religious 
minorities into flood shelters. 
Desportes (2019) reports that to support disaster victims of Chin ethnicity, parallel minority and 
diaspora networks were mobilised. Relief, which was not always distributed in a transparent or 
unbiased manner, was channelled from ethnically and religiously affiliated groups within and 
outside of Myanmar. Strong civil society structures and ties between Christian NGOs and INGOs 
also increased support, or at least attention, from the international humanitarian system.  
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Navigating an aid system that is itself adjusting to the recent political and humanitarian 
developments in Myanmar, proactive Chin individuals carefully selected their lobbying strategies, 
targets and allies. Some selectively foregrounded or backgrounded their ethnic identity 
depending on whether their interlocutor would be receptive to a more political minority discourse. 
Two major points can be drawn from the findings (Desportes, 2019).  
 First, it is striking that a parallel system set up specifically to support marginalised 
groups—whether led by civil society, as was the case for the Chin, or by international 
actors, as was seen for Muslims in Rakhine—can be considered the only viable short-
term solution. In the long-term, such parallel systems may increase feelings of exclusion 
and deepen the divide between antagonistic societal groups and between the Myanmar 
government and the international community. 
 Second, especially in the context of rising identity politics, humanitarian governance 
encompasses the governance of perceptions. Navigating the multiple and rapidly 
evolving conflict realities is difficult even within a single country, especially for aid 
organisations with country-wide mandates. As seen in the 2015 Komen response, 
satisfying the expectations of the multiple audiences is nearly impossible: Should one risk 
compromising government authorisations, community acceptance and associated 
security, or the principle of impartiality and, possibly, international funding? Balancing 
between governing various perceptions and allocating aid resources according to 
humanitarian principles involves largely unavoidable trade-offs that must be carefully 
evaluated by practitioners and policy makers. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Bishop of Truro (2019) has indicated that religious persecution is evident across sub-Saharan 
Africa. Evidence gathered by his report indicated that Al-Shabaab represented a threat to 
Christians in Kenya and Somalia. Long-term widespread internal conflict and endemic poverty 
had incubated a form of religious extremism specifically intolerant of Christians.  Reports have 
cited the existence of Daesh (ISIS) cells in Somalia, with extremist militants accused of being 
behind a video, released in December 2017, calling on militants ‘to “hunt down” the non-believers 
and attack churches and markets (Bishop of Truro, 2019). As Zimmerman (2011) has 
highlighted, that denial of access by al Shabaab militants, and in armed militias, is the single 
greatest obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Al Shabaab not only creates a 
prohibitive security environment, but also restricts humanitarian operations in southern Somalia. 
The group has banned many international aid agencies from operating within territories under its 
control. 
Signs of religious intolerance are also present in the Central African Republic (CAR). Here the 
Bishop of Truro (2019) reported on widespread attacks – perhaps even “early signs of genocide” 
against Muslims carried out by anti-Balaka militants. Reports indicated that the militants styled 
themselves as ‘defending Christianity but CAR Church leaders have repeatedly repudiated the 
notion that anti-Balaka should be characterised as “a Christian group”, pointing to the presence 
of animists amongst them. Attacks on Christians in CAR by ex-Seleka militants were reportedly 
carried out in defence of Muslims, nonetheless many innocent Churchgoers were targeted. In 
Mali, a peace settlement, which followed the 2013 ousting of Islamist militants, did not pave the 
way to a complete restoration of law and order. Clergy reporting on the situation in northern Mali 
described sporadic suicide bomb incidents, but said that there were no specific attacks against 
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Christians. However, other reports, including from the south of the country, did describe 
deliberate targeting of Christians by extremists.  
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